WORLD WITH/OUT WARS: MORAL SPACES AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

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Politicians, commentators and students of history and politics should, perhaps, all attend divorce courts – before and after briefings, books, lectures and other 'learning'. Their essential lesson, that diametrically opposed yet equally logical versions of events can be constructed from the same facts, when proceeding from different premises and values, needs constant reminder. This does not mean that we must not judge. It means that we best not judge so absolutely; for our knowledge is never absolute, our judgment never incontestable. To pretend otherwise is to embrace the banners of prejudice, partisanship, conflict and war.

C. G. Jacobsen (1993)

The twentieth century has been the most violent in all human history (Tilly 1992). If we wish the 21st century to be otherwise, we must mend our ways. This essay is dedicated to that proposition. But before proceeding to preach peace, a careful analysis of the problem is called for. Since 1900, about 250 new international and civil wars have been waged in which about 100 million soldiers and perhaps another 100 million civilians have died. Counting only military casualties, the 18th century had a casualty rate of 50 per million population per year as compared to 60 during the 19th century, and 460 per million so far for the 20th century. The end of the Cold War brought forth a ray of hope, but subsequent outbreaks of violence in many world trouble-spots have chastened those hopes. Rapidly expanding global communication provides another source for hoping to achieve greater long-term understanding among nations and cultures.

Since Marshall McLuhan (1968), it has become commonplace to speak of a **global village**. But it is far less acknowledged that the global village is increasingly resembling a medieval world in which the Lords of the Manors live in opulent castles, protected by their electronic moats of surveillance – the wired corporate, government, and high class neighbourhood centres – surrounded by the squalor of life and clamour of the teeming, restless serfs working the fields – i. e. the urban ghettoes and rural peripheries. It should occasion no surprise that the serfs increasingly fight their battles with the most powerful means still left at their disposal – their primordial identities of gender, race, caste, religion, and na-

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tionality. The politicization of culture may be thus inaugurating a new cold war between the Lords of the Manor and the peasants far more ferocious than the old cold war (Jürgensmeyer 1994). For the coming decades, religious, nationalist, nativist, and feminist movements will constitute the main forms of resistance against the dominant globalist hegemony.

The parallels between the late 20th century and the early Middle Ages have been evocatively explored by Umberto Eco, Jacques Attali, and Lewis H. Lapham among others. Similar to the Fall of Rome, the dissolution of the European imperial systems in the second half of the 20th century, has assumed the appearance of a neo-feudal order in which a **globalist** State-Corporate alliance controls the markets of ideas and commodities while the **localist** forces of resistance and revolt fight on to maintain their porous and vulnerable territorial and cultural spaces. So long as the old Cold War persisted, it seemed as if a rough balance of power is creating a buffer zone in the Third World between the two global systems of capitalism and communism. With the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet empire as the last of the European empires, the moral geographies of the state system have shifted from bipolar rivalries towards a contestation between globalism, regionalism, nationalism, and localism with environmentalism, feminism, and religious-cultural resurgence as ubiquitous in most contexts (Tehranian 1993). The global village thus contains its established centres (European Union and NAFTA), the emerging peripheries of centres (East Asia, ASEAN, South Africa, and certain oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), struggling peripheries (much of Latin America and the Middle East), and stagnating peripheries of peripheries (much of black Africa). The fate of Central and Eastern European countries hangs on whether they can establish firm alliances with the Lords of the Manor or become marginalized.

Metaphors are, of course, more suggestive than explanatory. But the metaphor of a wired global village with its castles, lords, shamans, peasants, and jesters has the value of shocking us into the recognition of the contradictions of global modernization, democratization, and communication. Since the 16th century, all three processes have contributed to the development of a global hierarchy of nations, races, and genders organized around the moral geographies of city-states, nation-states, empire-states, and increasingly global states and corporations (Tehranian 1994). Individuals and groups find their place in this hierarchy in accordance with their degree of access to the economic, political, and communication resources of the states and corporations at the centres and peripheries of power. The unfolding of this historical process has progressively incorporated the world into an order of modernity and post-modernity in which the contradictions of the global and the local have become a central problematic of our own age.

Despite their largely military origins and applications (Levidow & Robins 1989), modern communication technologies have generally had a dual effects. Although lags and leads abound and it takes a while for any technological innovation such as broadcasting, satellites, or computers to be transferred from their military uses to civilian applications, once they enter the consumer marketplace, they often lead to dispersions as well as centralization of power, democratization as well as counter-democratic formations, globalization as well as localization of culture, and contestations among conflicting moral spaces as well as competing notions of political sovereignty, national identity, and civil rights. Although centres by far outrank the peri-pheries in media ownership and access and technological arsenal, the control of territorial and cultural spaces is still more or less in the hands of the peripheries. However, global communication has been deterritorializing culture, confronting com-

peting truth claims, and opening the way for global negotiations on an ethics of transnational communication that can potentially reconcile the indigenous localities and loyalties with the global ecumens.

The Dual Effects of Global Communication

The debate on the effects of the mass media on democratic and counter-democratic formations seems never-ending, but historical evidence largely supports a dual effects hypothesis (Tehranian 1990). The political and social impact of the print, telephony, broadcasting, computers, satellites, and multi-media technologies, each could be argued to have supported both concentrations and dispersions of power. The evid-ence thus negates technological determinism. On the contrary, it suggests that "the structure is the message." It is the institutional arrangements and social forces into which technologies are grafted that largely determine their uses. There seems to be however, as Harold Innis (1950) argued, a bias in certain technologies for certain outcomes. The print technology tended to democratize knowledge, propagate the vernacular languages, strengthen nationalism, and undermine the authority of the Church and the monarchies. Broadcasting's one-way channels of communication seem to have largely supported national integration and control from the centres. Satellites and computers tend to undermine national borders and sovereignties. Interactive multi-media tend to fragment and reconfigure audiences. The small media of communication (copying machines, audio and video recorders, personal computers) tend to empower their users and decentralize power. However, none of these possible effects are automatic or inevitable. In fact, the contrary may and has happened in revolutionary situations (Tehranian 1979). When combined with democratic or counter-democratic forces, the same technologies can have contradictory consequences.

Similarly, global communication is producing contradictory effects. A dual process of globalization of the local, and localization of the global is making isolationism and dissociation virtually impossible for any nation, even those that have de-voutly pursued it for a while such as China, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and Iran. At the same time, local conflicts such as those in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia have been constantly globalized by the power of media coverage. While globalization is fundamentally a top-down process, localization is bottom-up. The agents of trans-nationalization consist of the global hard and soft networks primarily facilitated by the non-state actors. The hard networks consist of transportation, telecommunication, and travel/tourism (TTT) facilities spun around the globe connecting the core in networks of communication. The soft networks provide the programs that negotiate and integrate the competing interests and values of the global players. These include global conferences, newspapers, broadcasting, advertising, education, and exchanges of information. In the meantime, the localization processes are working through their own hard and soft networks, at times employing the core networks and at other times developing their own independent periphery systems. The agents of localization and tribalization consist of the nationalist, religious, nativist, and feminist movements and leaders voicing the peripheries' interests and views. In contrast to the Big Media of the Core, they often employ the low-cost, accessible, and elusive Small Media such as low-powered radios and television, audio-cassettes, portable videos, copying and fax machines, and personal computer networking. Their software consists of the rich heritage of primordial myths and identities embedded in the traditional religious, nationalist, tribal, and localist ideologies.

The infrastructure of a global civilization has been fast growing by such transnational events and networks as the Media Events, CNN, BBC World TV, Star TV, MTV,

Internet, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While the first five are largely one-way, top-down channels, the last two provide interactive, bottom-up, international communication channels. *Media Events* (Dayan & Katz 1992) of the last few decades (the landing on the moon, the Sadat visit to Jerusalem, the Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War, the ecological disasters, and Rabin-Arafat's handshake in Washington) have brought about a new global consciousness, not on what to think but of what to think **about**. In concert with both the globalist and localist forces, the agenda setting function of global media has played a critical part in focusing attention on certain key events to the detriment of the voiceless peoples and silent issues such as routinized child malnutrition, women's repression, and unrepresented peoples' sufferings.

Since 1985, the steady growth of CNN into the world's first global news network has provided the elites in most parts of the world with a stream of live broadcasts in English, Spanish, Japanese, Polish, and soon French and German. In 1987, to counter the Western bias of its news, CNN started airing the CNN World Report, providing uncensored and unedited news reports from local broadcasters all over the world. By 1992, some 10,000 local news items had been aired on the World Report, originating from a total of 185 news organizations representing 130 countries. CNN's internationally-distributed satellite signal is within reach of nearly 98% of the world's population, although reception is a different matter (Pai 1993; McPhail 1993; Flourney 1992). While in the more developed countries (MDCs), it tends to be a mass medium, in the less developed (LDCs) it is still an elite source of news reception.

CNN has thus become more than a news medium. It is also serving as a channel for public diplomacy working often faster than the private channels of traditional diplomacy. Many headers of states and responsible officials watch the CNN during crises in order to directly assess the events abroad while gauging the impact of those events on the domestic and international public opinion. Fidel Castro is reported to have been one of the first world leaders to regularly watch the CNN service. During the Gulf Crisis, President Bush indicated at a press conference that he will call up President Ozal of Turkey while the latter was watching the CNN's live coverage; the telephone call came through a few minutes later while President Ozal was waiting for it. Peter Arnet's reporting from Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War filled some of the communication gaps between Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world. CNN, however, provides a global picture primarily through an American prism. Britain is trying to emulate the CNN success story through the BBC World Service Television, while Japan has considered the establishment of an NHK-led Global News Network (GNN) (Lee, 1993). Star Television, acquired by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation in 1993, covers most of Asia through direct broadcast satellite (DBS).

Similarly, MTV is exporting the youthful, whimsical, irreverent, post-modernist, American cultural values into Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although possessing universal appeal, however, MTV is following a localization strategy wherever it goes. Stimulated by the example of a popular program that is promotional in selling the music it plays, local record companies have been quick to take up the challenge. India's Megasound spent only $5,000 to produce a video featuring India's first Hindi rap tune by the local artist Baba Segal. "The album ended up selling 500,000 copies. Darren Childs, MTV Asia's head of programming, said that the Asian content of its programming has risen from 5% when the channel first aired, to as high as 50% at certain times of the day. The station has 'broken' formerly unknown acts and turned them into regional stars. In addition to the regional stars, the VJ's (Video Jockeys) of MTV Asia are another important reason why viewers tune

in. They are all Asian or part Asian providing Western wackiness while toning down the grungy, street-smart image of MTV VJ's elsewhere to ensure that local audiences can still identify them" (Lee 1993). MTV is thus contributing to the creation of an intended or unintended global, post-modernist sub-culture with far-reaching consequences.

INTERNET is another fast growing transnational network that connects an estimated 20 million people around the world via over 1 million mainframe computers in a global network of networks. One million new users are estimated to be joining the network each month. At that rate, the network will have about 100 million users by the year 2000. If we count the members of such major commercial, on-line services as Prodigy, American Online, Delphi, Dialogue, and Compuserve logging into Internet, that figure will be probably soon surpassed. In 1992, *The Whole Internet Users' Guide and Catalogue* sold 125,000 copies, outpacing Madonna's Sex book. A dozen other guides currently compete for the market, including *Zen and the Art of Internet* (Anon 1994). It is no wonder that marketers are viewing the network as a potential electronic gold mine. However, attempts at commercializing the network have faced serious resistance by the current users. As Stecklow (1993, A1) notes: "Residents of 'cyberspace,' as the on-line computer galaxy is known, are a world apart. They do not take kindly to sales pitches or electronic cold calling. Many view themselves as pioneers of a new and better vehicle for free speech. Unlike television viewers, radio listeners or newspaper readers, they are hooked up to the message sender and other Internet parties interactively – meaning that an offense to their sensibilities can result in quick, embarrassing reports viewed by countless of the network's estimated 15 million users."

This new Network Nation consists of computer-literate professionals from all continents and all fields, united in the fine arts of chatting, gossiping, exchanging, and collaborating in a variety of projects from scientific research to dating, financing, politicking, celebrating, or commiserating. The National Science Foundation (NSF), which subsidizes the network, has no control over a number of other data lines that are also part of the web. The NSF will start phasing out its $11.5 million annual subsidy in 1994. However, the US government and businesses are stepping in. Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation has announced that it will acquire Delphi Internet Services Inc., an on-line service that provides Internet access to consumers; Continental Cablevision, the third-largest cable-television company in the United States, is offering Internet access to its cable subscribers; and American Telephone and Telegraph Co., is planning to make Internet available to some data communication customers via a nationwide, toll-free telephone number (Stecklow 1993, A1).

The Clinton Administration has promised that by the year 2,000, every school and public facility will have the capability of logging into this vast network. On September 15, 1993, Vice-President Al Gore unveiled a plan to coordinate the public and private sector efforts in building a national "electronic super-highway" in the United States. This has raised the perennial question of the trade-offs between efficiency and equity in telecommunication. While the US National Information Infrastructure plans still remain ambiguous, they aim at creating a more efficient flow of communication and information through integrated system digital networks (ISDN). Similar to an earlier drive for the construction of transcontinental, inter-state, super-highways under the Eisenhower Administration, the metaphor of "electronic super-highways" under the Clinton Administration promises greater mobility and productivity. However, it cannot necessarily guarantee greater equity. Just as the transportation super-highways facilitated the transfer of population and resources from the US Northeast to the South and the West, the new electronic super-highways

are also going to redistribute wealth, income, and information access, regionally as well as socially. The transportation super-highways facilitated the industrialization of the South and the West, de-industrialization of the Northeast, the migration of the Afro-Americans to the northern cities, the out-migration of upper and middle income white groups from the cities into the suburbs, the consequent erosion of the urban tax base resulting in urban decay and the creation of an urban underclass. Unless public policy vigorously pursues equity and universal access, an unintended consequence of the new electronic super-highways could be the creation of a permanent information underclass. Similar information super-highways are likely to be constructed by the European Union, Japan, and other major economies. They will also probably bypass the poorer regions of the world and create a global information underclass.

Without telephones, the less developed countries and regions of the world would not be able to drive on the global electronic super-highways. Telephones are the linchpin of the new integrated telecommunication systems. Without them it would be impossible to log-in the new data-bases and networks. Yet, the global distribution of telephony is more lopsided than any other modern media. In 1992, some 50 countries accounting for over half the world's population had a teledensity of less than 1, i. e. less than one telephone line per 100 inhabitants. While the high income countries have 71% of the world's 575 million phone main lines, upper middle income countries control 15%, lower middle income 10%, and low income only 4% (Tarjanne 1994). Some newly industrializing countries in East Asia are however closing the gap, but many other LDCs are falling behind. On the whole, world telephone distribution patterns have remained relatively unchanged in the last hundred years. Unless public policy intervenes, growing information gaps seem to be reinforcing income gaps that in turn would have to be maintained through domestic policing and international military actions.

The new global information marketplace includes four major components: (1) the owners of the highways, the common carriers, paid for by the private or public sectors, (2) the producers of information hardware such as telephones, televisions, and computers, (3) the producers of information software such as the press, broadcasters, libraries, and infopreneurs, and (4) information consumers who demand efficiency, equity, privacy, affordability, and choice. In response to the convergence of information and communication technologies, the US government aims at the removal of all barriers to entry into any particular sector of the market. This will eventually lead to the full technological and economic integration of the print, film, broadcasting, cable, telephone, cellular phone, computer, and data-base industries – a process that has already begun by the emergence of giant, multi-media conglomerates.

In another speech on January 11, 1994, Vice-President Gore outlined the following five principles that will guide any future US legislation and regulation concerning communication industries. The Administration will (1) encourage private investment, (2) provide and protect competition, (3) provide open access to the Network, (4) take action to avoid creating a society of information haves and have-nots, and (5) encourage flexible and responsive governmental action (CRTNET, #915, January 12, 1994). Given these policy principles, will the coming information super-highway be accessible to everyone regardless of their income? The Vice-President was reassuring on that question (CRTNET, #900, December 22, 1993): "The principle of universal service has been interpreted in the case of telephone service to mean that what we now have is about 93, 94 percent of all American families have telephone service and it is regarded as affordable to virtually – by virtually everyone. Our definition of

universal service, once the cluster of services that are encompassed is agreed upon is that approximately the same percentage should have access to the richer information products as well, so that a school child in my hometown of Carthage, Tennessee, population 2,000, could come home after class and sit down and instead of playing a video game with a cartridge, plug into the Library of Congress and learn at his or her own pace according to the curiosity that seizes that child at the moment – not just in the form of words, but color moving graphics and pictures."

The same concerns for information access and equity have been expressed by an international movement for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (Lee 1985; Traber & Nordenstreng 1992; Galtung & Vincent 1992). As the advanced industrial world has moved ahead, the gap between the information haves and have-nots have demonstrably grown on a global scale. Except for a handful of East Asian countries (Japan, S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and low population and high income oil exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates), other LDCs have been so far unable to catch up. One relatively hopeful sign in this bleak picture is the role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are playing. The convergence of NGO computer networks and low cost-information technologies is offering opportunities for social movements to develop their own news services and information dissemination systems. In the late 1980s, the Association for Progressive Communication (APC) was established as a non-profit network to facilitate global communication among the NGOs. As Frederick (1993, 97) notes: "Comprising more than 20,000 subscribers in 95 countries, the APC Networks constitute a veritable honour role of organizations working in these fields, including Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, Greenpeace, labour unions and peace organizations. There are APC partner networks in the United Sates, Nicaragua, Brazil, Russia, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and Germany and affiliated systems in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, Kenya and other countries. The APC even has an affiliate network in Cuba providing the first free flow of information between the United States and Cuba in thirty years. Dozens of FidoNet systems connect with the APC through 'gateways' located at the main nodes."

APC affiliates now broadcast more than 20 alternative news agencies, 20 newsletters and magazines, 4 radio station news scripts, and a wide variety of specialist files to which non-conventional voices contribute news and opinion. There are also over 10,000 NGOs enlisting millions of people around the world working for a vast variety of civic goals, from protection of the global environment to the defense of human rights and other endangered species. These social and technological networks together constitute a global civil society that provides, to some degree, a countervailing power to those of national states and transnational corporations.

The bias of each different communication technology has created unmistakably different links between that particular medium and cultural change through history (Tehranian 1990, Ch. 3). Each medium has created or privileged a particular sector of society's communication elites. The oral traditions privileged the **shamans** and soothsayers as the paramount institutional memories and voices of the community. The invention of writing created a new class of **scribes** by the establishment of priesthood acting as the custodians of the holy scriptures and the newly-formed religious institutions. The introduction of print brought about a new secular priesthood in the form of modern **intelligentsia** challenging the authorities of monarchies and religious institutions. The rise of the mass media (newspapers and radio) contributed to the emergence of mass movements in the 19th and 20th centuries led by a new class of **ideologues** (Lenin, Hitler, Mussolini, and Roosevelt), providing them with platforms

to preach their communist, fascist, or social democratic gospels to mass audiences. The rise of computer technologies and its impact on every aspect of economic and social life have created a new class of **technologues**. The diffusion of the small media of communication has boosted the power and influence of the traditional communication elites (the priests, the mullas, the monks, the community activists), i. e. the **communologues**, who can speak in the vernacular of common folks. The demystifying rise of the visual media (television, cable, and VCRs) seems to have led to a new and sceptical generation of communication elite that sees through the moral pretensions of the ideologues and communologues, a new class we may call **jestologues**.

The ideological contestations among these communication elites are weaving the global cultural tapestry of our own times. Premodern, modern, and postmodern cultures are commodified into a voracious stream of programming outlets in publishing, cinema, radio, television, videos, and multi-media. The shamanic, messianic, nativist, feminist, globalist, regionalist, nationalist, and localist ideologies simultaneously intrude and coexist in our consciousness. The premodern **weltanschauung** (shamanic, messianic, and nativist) combines with the modern ideologies (globalist, regionalist, nationalist, localist, and feminist) to produce postmodernist effects. The culture of post-modernity is relativistic, episodic, anti-narrative, despairing, ecstatic, playful, self-mocking, and jestful. It privileges the jestologues.

The battle between communologues and jestologues, between modernity and postmodernity, was dramatized by Ayatollah Khomeini's death warrant on Salman Rushdie. While the Ayatollah largely represents the modernists, ideologically committed to the sacred mission of realizing the Kingdom of God on this earth, Salman Rushdie voices the postmodern jester mocking all sanctities (Tehranian, 1992). Most interpretations of the confrontation have portrayed the Ayatollah as the traditional, religious bigot and Salman Rushdie as the modern, free-thinking intellectual. But the two figures and what they stand for in the contemporary world can be perhaps better understood if we view each in terms of the spatial and cultural dislocations of the postmodern world. Exiled for 15 years to Najaf and Paris, employing a combination of the traditional Islamic sermons with the most sophisticated modern propaganda tools in telecommunication, the Ayatollah represented a complex of premodern and modern cartography of power. His call for Islamic unity against an imperialist West and their secularizing agents is at once a counter-globalist, nativist, and messianic strategy. The Ayatollah may be thus considered more of a modernist than traditionalist Islamic leader in his totalizing strategy of fusing the state and the mosque into a single theocratic regime. Salman Rushdie suggests the dislocated Third World intellectual, highly educated and privileged, at the centre of world cultural happenings, but uprooted, marginalized, and sceptical of all sanctities. He thus serves as a postmodern critic in his deconstructionist strategy of mocking the traditional and modern sacred cows. The postmodern strategy is to shock, to startle, and to decentre in order to dethrone the sacred and the naturalized. Its paramount medium is the musical video, its message is, "Give me my MTV!" Its heroes are the deconstructionist anti-heroes (Beavis and Butthead), the new self-mocking shamans of electronic rock music (e. g. Sting or Bono), or the glittering stars of multiple identities and sexualities (e. g. Madonna and Michael Jackson).

The conflict between the premodern, modern, and postmodern is thus part of the cultural landscape of a developmentally uneven, historically schizoid, contemporary world. The pre-modern, modern, and post-modern cultural orientations present different views of time, space, being, science, technology, and aesthetics to suggest a

series of contrasts that, when politicized, can produce irreconcilable epistemologies and praxiologies (K. Tehranian 1994, ch. 2). That is a central paradox of our time. Increasing channels in international communication have often led to increasing dialogues of the deaf (Tehranian 1982).

Identities and Cartographies of Violence

One arena in which such wars of words are conducted is the moral spaces of violent conflicts. Except for the deranged acts of random violence, resort to force has to be often legitimated in terms of grander and more generally acceptable moral schemes than the specific situations at conflict. But when the use of violence is a collective act as in wars, in order to mobilize the material and moral support of the population, such legitimations also have to be grounded in specific times, spaces, and identities. With the exception of Japan, the main belligerent in the First and Second World Wars were European or of European origin operating within the modern nation-state system. The wars were primarily fought on behalf of nationalist causes buttressed by such broader slogans as "to make the world safe for democracy," "Aryan supremacy," "the four freedoms," or "Asia for the Asians." By contrast, wars of the second half of the 20th century have been often fought among nations at different stages of historical development with fundamentally different senses of time, space, identity, shame, and honour. In some ways, these wars hark back to the struggle between the European imperialists and the indigenous populations in Asia, Africa, and Americas in the 15-19th centuries when entire peoples and civilizations were wiped out in the name of "the White man's burden."

The rapid spread of global communication in the second half of the 20th century has significantly changed the rules of engagement and cartographies of violence. Its dual effects have both globalized and pluralized the voices to be heard. Although the dominant voices are still those primarily in control of the world media, the new polyphony is creating both cognitive dissonance as well as possibilities for cognitive enlightenment on a global scale. The cartographies of violence, the imaginaries and mental maps of conflict, are no longer confined to the nation-state borders. They constantly twist and turn, sometimes referring to the sanctity of borders (as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) but at other times defending the rights of "humanitarian intervention" as in the case of the no-fly zones in Iraq and Bosnia. By contrast, the so-called terrorist wars know no boundaries at all. The entire globe is the stage for the exercise of violence at times and places of the belligerent choosing – at the Olympics, in the airways, the World Trade Centre, in the Hebron mosque. The shifting physical spaces of violence thus call for the juxtaposition of a variety of moral spaces.

Global communication has also reconfigured the identities of violence. The self often defines itself in opposition to "the other". In situations of conflict, the self is frequently imagined as morally righteous or superior, while "the other" is frequently cast as morally depraved or inferior. However, when "the enemy" is confronted face-to-face in all of his or her humanity, it is far more difficult to maintain a level of self-righteousness sufficient to sustain systematic efforts at total annihilation. An accommodation is often sought in which the enemy is subdued and manipulated to serve the purposes of the victor. Global communication has thus raised the moral cost of genocides, but it has not ruled them out altogether. The enemy now has to be abstracted rather than identified. Instead of talking about how many Germans or Vietcongs have been killed, the new language of the military speaks of "body counts" or "collateral damage," respectively referring to the military and civilian ca-

sualties. The new high technologies of warfare have distantiated, abstracted, and further alienated the aliens. The enemy can now be considered as totally anonymous while the laser weapons and guided missiles are showered on "military targets" with some "collateral damage." During the Gulf War, the only significant time in which a human person was hinted at on television screens was when General Schwarzkopf pointed to a car driving through a bridge before Patriot missiles hit their target. That man (woman?) was called "the luckiest man alive in Iraq." For the rest of the time, the war was reconstructed in powerful images as a high-tech video-game with few human casualties and consequently little moral cost. The abstracting power of technologies has combined with the cognitive dissonances of colliding moral spaces to render postmodern warfare nearly incomprehensible and thus morally ambiguous.

Shifting moral spaces, cartographies of violence, and imaginary boundaries have thus made the understanding of postmodern warfare extremely difficult. In place of the moral clarity of the premodern face-to-face combat and the modern nationstate-against-nationstate war, we are now facing new types of violence induced by nuclear fall-outs (as in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Pacific Islands victims of nuclear tests), biological and chemical weapons (such as Agent Orange in the Vietnam War, chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf wars), high tech weapons such as the American Patriot missiles showered on Iraq and the Iraqi Scud missiles showered on Israel, and guided missiles sometimes hitting innocent civilian targets. The most telling of such automated warfare occurred in 1988 when the US cruiser Vicennes shot down the civilian Iran Airbus A300 with two anti-aircraft missiles in the final weeks of the Iran-Iraq war after mistaking it for an attacking warplane. Two hundred and ninety (290) people were killed. Iran took the case to the International Court of Just-ice, while the United States has refused to accept the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the missile was shot in self-defense after repeated warnings (NYT, March 22, 1994, p. A5).

The Moral Ambiguity of Postmodern Warfare

Table 1 presents a schematic view of the main perceptible differences between premodern, modern, and postmodern forms of warfare, identity, organization, and legitimation. A few caveats are in order. First, the table should be viewed as more suggestive than definitive. It is constructed primarily for analytic and heuristic purposes, to open rather than close considerations of significant differences. Second, although the table may suggest otherwise, this is **not** a stage theory of warfare. Clearly, most contemporary wars are a complex mix of all three "pure types". Like all historical events, each war is unique but also a conjunction of elements from the old and new technologies, strategies, and tactics. Lastly, in certain respects, there seems to be a curious resemblance between the premodern and postmodern forms. That raises a question: Are we facing a historical regression, conjunction, or transformation?

Modern and postmodern warfares have exhibited several mutually reinforcing features, including globality (Tilly 1992), totality (Aron), representationality (Virilio 1989; Mowlana et al. 1993), invisibility (Nietschmann 1987), and moral ambiguity. The globality and totality of modern wars are matters of general consensus. World Wars I and II fully demonstrated the global and total nature of the new modern warfare. Since 1945, however, wars have been simultaneously fought at two fronts – global and local. But as threats to the prevailing world order, local wars have been often conducted as part of the larger global struggle between the two superpowers during the Cold War and since its end in 1989.

Global communication has made wars more global, total, and representational than ever before. The unprecedented peace among the European and North Amer-

Table I: Models of Warfare, Identity, Organization, and Legitimation

	Premodern	Modern	Postmodern
Time	Sporadic Periodized	Discrete Declared (Overt)	Permanent Undeclared (Covert)
Space	Tribal Pre-State Tribal Empires	National State Nation-States	Global Post-State Global Systems
Identity	Tribalist Tribal Member Identity Security Embodiment	Nationalist Civilian Soldier Identity Anxiety Co-embodiment	Globalist-Localist Professional Soldier Identity Panic Disembodiment
Organization	Spiritual-Temporal Existential Ritualized Immanent Tribal Institutions	Secular-Civilian Bureaucratic Regularized Visible Military institutions	Military-Industrial Technocratic Totalized Invisible Total
Institutions	Warriors Individual Combat Medium Intensity Conflict Physical-Political Violence	Mobilized Population Mass Assault High Intensity Conflict Political-Economic Violence	Expert Population Technical Targetting Low Intensity Conflict Cultural-Environmental Violence
Legitimation	Pre-legitimation Dictates of Nature Ontological Naturalist Manliness	Legitimation Reasons of State Ideological Instrumentalist Patriotism	Post-Legitimation Economic Motivations Praxiological Naturalized Acquiescence

Sources: Clausewitz (1976), Creveld (1989, 1991), Leviow & Robins (1989), Galtung (1990), Hassig (1988), Nietschmann (1987), Shapiro (1993a, 1993b), K. & M. Tehranian (1992), K. Tehranian (1994), Tilly (1992).

ican states since 1945 has led some observers to call this an Era of Long Peace. However, that completely ignores the protracted violence that has continued to plague the Third World nations in the same period in a variety of guises, ranging from wars of national liberation against the colonialists, to multilateral wars (in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Somalia, Bosnia), bilateral wars (Israel-Palestine, Iran-Iraq), as well as many insurgencies and civil wars. These "little wars" have already taken over 5 million casualties – combatant and civilians – in addition to inflicting some of the most brutal forms of violence such as ethnic cleansing, forced migration, rape, chemical, biological, and environmental warfare. Television screens have brought the images of violence to the teeming audiences around the world, sometimes distorting its real-ity as in the Gulf War, at other times, mobilizing governments and nations into belated action as in Somalia and Bosnia, but at all times providing only a manufactured representation of what goes on. TV news is typically episodic, dichotomizing conflict stories into goodies and baddies, friends and enemies, demonizing the enemies, and desensitizing moral sensibilities. In an age of professional, technocratic wars, "the enemies" in remote moral spaces tend to be viewed as sub-human and barbaric to be civilized even by force of arms for their own good. Such mystifications of the enemy would not be a readily available moral option except in a postmodern age of dominance of glossy images covering many complex realities. Although all reality is socially constructed, when the commercial media manufacture it to achieve high entertainment value and ratings, the sensational and abnormal take precedence over the routinized forms of human suffering such as malnutrition, child mortality,

forced migration, and short life-expectancy. Since Western audiences have little access to alternative constructions of reality, i. e. the corrective reality checks, the manufactured images of television are readily accepted as truth, particularly when that truth also uplifts the national pride. Eighty percent of American audiences, for example, receive their news primarily through television. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Persian Gulf War as manufactured on television screens (high tech, low casualty, high returns, low cost) was supported by about 80% of the American people.

Despite its high profile during major flare-ups, postmodern violence tends to be on the whole invisible. Over half-million children die each year of malnutrition and chromic diseases as compared with about 400,000 adults dying violent deaths, yet the story of the children rarely reaches the audiences (Kent 1993). Many of the conflicts of the postwar era have persisted for many years with heavy casualties, yet media coverage is scant until something dramatic happens. Table 2 provides a somewhat incomplete picture of the protracted conflicts, some stretching back as far as some 70 years ago. The vast majority of wars worldwide have been between established states and nascent nations struggling for recognition and sometimes statehood. Table 3 shows that of the 120-odd wars, 72 percent (86) have been state-nation conflicts. As organized systems of violence, states are thus the root of the problem, yet the general impression conveyed by the mass media is that sporadic violence by terrorist groups or insurgencies are primarily to blame. A total of 82 percent of protracted conflicts have involved nascent nations. The United Nations membership currently stands at 190 states. If we consider that there are anywhere between 3,000 to 5,000 linguistic groups in the world in search of nationhood and possibly statehood, we can easily see what types of conflict will predominate in the decades to come. The state system has privileged the dominant nations often at the expense of the weaker nations within their boundaries. It is quite reasonable for the repressed nations such as the Kurds or the Tibetans to struggle for statehood, because that appears to be the only way to gain international recognition and to achieve their civil and human rights.

The unwinability and moral ambiguity of postmodern warfare may be a matter of dispute. However, if we consider the colossal damage a nuclear war would inflict on both victors and vanquished, unwinability and moral ambiguity can be acknowledged as unmistakable features of at least the nuclear types of confrontation. Which way the wind blows would largely determine the extent of casualties on either side. The nuclear balance of terror between the two superpowers kept them away from unleashing a global war for some 44 years (1945-1989). Since the end of the Cold War, it has spurred their efforts towards nuclear disarmament and against nuclear proliferation. No conceivable moral cause could justify a nuclear holocaust. Pacifists consider all wars immoral, but realists should concede that at least nuclear wars are self-defeating and immoral. Beyond that, the protracted struggles between the dominant state system and the nascent nations have demonstrated that such wars are also not winable. The Kurdish, Palestinian, Tibetan, and Kashmiri struggles for civil rights and national independence have been waged for long periods of time. The cycles of violence generated by these protracted conflicts have undermined whatever moral justification either side of the conflict may have had for its actions. In many instances also, the wars have proved themselves to be unwinable on either side. Political expediency as well as moral imperative thus call for pacific settlements, yet the warring parties are caught in escalating cycles of violence from which it has proved extremely difficult to extract themselves.

Table 2: Duration and Casualties of Protracted Conflicts, 1925-1994

National Wars	Duration of Conflict	State	No. Killed
Algerian FLN	17 years (1945-62)	France	500,000
Afghan Mujahedin	10 (1979)	USSR-Afghanistan	1,000,000
Kurdistan	69 (1925)	Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria	500,000
Kashmir	49 (1945)	India	
Euskidi	57 (1937)	Spain	
Kawthoolei	46 (1948)	Burma	
Shan	46 (1948)	Burma	
Nagaland	39 (1955)	India	
Chakma	30 (1964)	E. Pakistan/Bangladesh	
Ulster	33 (1961)	Britain	2,500
Western Sahara	19 (1975)	Morocco	160,000
Tigray	19 (1975?)	Cuba/Ethiopia	
Kalinga	19 (1975)	Philippines	
Pathan	10 (1979-89?)	USSR/Afghanistan	
Kirghiz	10 (1979-89?)	USSR/Afghanistan	
Miskitos	13 (1981)	Nicaragua	
Hutu	?	Burundi	200,000
NDF Nations	?	Burma	250,000
Mayas	?	Guatemala	80,000
Moros	?	Philippines	100,000
Baluchs, Pathans	?	Pakistan	9,000
Tamils	?	Sri Lanka	4,500
Tibet	34 (1950)	China	
Multinational Wars			
Palestine	57 (1937)	Britain/Israel	
Eriterea	33 (1961)	Cuba/Ethiopia	100,000
West Papua	32 (1962)	Indonesia	200,000 (50% of pop)
East Timor	19 (1975)	Indonesia	200,000 (1/3 of pop)
Lebanon (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Christian, Palestinian)	36 (1958)	US-Syria-Israel	125,000
Insurgency Wars			
M19, etc.	46 (1948)	Colombia	
URNG/FAR, etc.	34 (1960)	Guatemala	
NPA	15 (1979)	Philippines	
ANS/KLPNLF/KPNLA	15 (1979)	Vietnam/Kampuchea	
FMLN	15 (1979)	El Salvador	
FDN	12 (1982)	Nicaragua	
Islamic parties		Algeria	
State Wars			
Arab states	46 (1948)	Israel	
Ethiopia	30 (1964)	Somalia	
Libya	21 (1973)	Chad	
Iran	8 (1980-88)	Iraq	1,000,000+
Israel	12 (1982)	Syria	
Israel	12 (1982)	Lebanon	

Towards An Ethics of Transnational Communication

"It is possible to live in peace," Gandhi once said. Peace, in other words, is both desirable and practical. However, to pursue peace with violent means has historically proved self-defeating. But pursuing peace with peaceful means requires a value system that puts the preservation of life forms above all else. It also requires a form of communication that is dialogical in character and transnational in its epistemological reach. In such an endeavour, the following seven propositions on the practicality of peace may prove useful:

1. In human relations, conflicts of interests and perceptions are ubiquitous. Peace is not the absence of conflict. Peace, in fact, welcomes the inevitability of human conflict as a reality that makes reconciliation possible through communication and conflict resolution.

2. Conflict can be less destructive and even creative if channelled into understanding and accommodating the interests and perceptions of others. Conflict can serve functional or dysfunctional purposes. If accompanied by violence – physical, political, economic, cultural, or environmental – human conflict can become dysfunctional by developing into a cycle of never-ending violence. But if conflict is expressed through open, equal, and interactive communication, it can lead to greater understanding and accommodation of interests and perceptions of the conflicting parties.

3. Dialogical communication and conflict mitigation, regulation, and resolution can fulfil this purpose through a variety of methods such as negotiation, adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and satyragraha (non-violent resistance). Dialogical communication, defined as open, equal, and interactive, can facilitate conflict mitigation, regulation, and resolution. The methods of conflict resolution are of necessity culture-bound and can themselves become subjects of conflict. But in a world of colliding cultural and moral spaces, we have no choice except to negotiate and develop synthetic, third cultures in order to bridge the gaps in meaning and understanding between the conflicting parties. A number of conflict resolution methods have, however, become universal in their application, including negotiation, adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and satyragraha (non-violent resistance). Education and training in such methods and any others emerging in the future would be of immense value to the mitigation, regulation, and resolution of conflicts at all levels.

4. However, individuals and collectivities are ontologically prone to project the dark side of their contradictory selves onto other(s) providing "legitimate" grounds for dichotomizing, demonizing, and devouring "the enemy" within and without. Conflicts often result, unfortunately, in framing, labelling, and name-calling of "the enemy". If such grounds of "legitimation" of conflict are routinized for a few generations, they are reified in the consciousnesses of the conflicting parties forming insurmountable prejudices that are difficult to overcome. Such are the racial, religious, and ethnic hatreds of several centuries.

5. Propensity to self-hatred, other-hatred, and violence also rises with increasing atomization of society, identity anxiety, and intensifying low self-esteem. The modern industrial world with its dislocating, atomizing, and abstracting effects on the individuals has become a breeding ground for such collective hatreds. Low esteem, bred by ontological insecurity and identity anxiety in the modern world, has proved a powerful force in the development of mass movements that have encouraged an "escape from freedom" (Fromm) and a social-psychology of scapegoating.

Table 3. Types of Conflict by Number and Percentage

Type	Number	Subtotals	Percent
State-state	4		3%
State-insurgency	18		15%
State-nation	77		
State-multination	5	86	72%
Foreign State Occupation	4		
Nation-Nation	5		
Insurgency-Nation	7	12	10%
Involving Nations		98	82%
Total	120		

Source: Nietschman 1987, 11.

6. Propensity to peace rises with increasing family and community bonding, identity security, self-respect, and respect for others. Conversely, ontological and identity security often leads to feelings of self and other respect. That, in turn, often paves the path to peace. Caring families and societies are thus generally peaceful families and societies. To cultivate a culture of peace, we must cultivate a just and caring society.

7. A culture of violence thus constantly dichotomizes self and others separating ends and means, while a culture of peace identifies the self significantly with the other viewing ends and means as a never-ending chain. As Gandhi taught, we must open the windows of our house to all cultural currants without being swept our own cultural feet. We can best discover global unity through exposure to and celebration of its diversity. Any worldview that dichotomizes between the self and other is vulnerable to obscurantism, failing to recognize that the human mind is now more than ever before a constellation of centuries of human collective unconscious. Any worldview that also draws a sharp distinction between ends and means, speaking of just and unjust wars, legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence, is laying itself open to a culture of violence feeding on self-serving moral pretensions. Moral self-righteousness is the first step in descending into the fire of anger and violence. Moral modesty is the first lesson into the recognition and acknowledgment of the truth claims of others.

Conclusion

Marshall McLuhan's global village has proved to be not a place of harmony but of colliding moral spaces. The Lords of the electronically-matted opulent castles and the rebellious serfs, shamans, and jesters surrounding them have confronted each other through a variety of violent encounters: physical, political, economic, cultural, and environmental. Some 3,000-5,000 nationalities around the world who have not yet received acknowledgment from the international community are increasingly clamouring to be subjects rather than objects of history. The global state-corporate system of organized violence will continue to be challenged by the sporadic but persistent acts of counter-violence unless the world learns to respect and celebrate diversity by devolving power to the smallest levels of human communities. In place of states of violence in which the world has learned to acquiesce, zones of peace can be built. Such zones, however, would have to rethink the problems of sovereignty, governance, economy, human rights, and civic responsibilities in order to accommodate a human diversity that can be homogenized only to the detriment of peace and justice.

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SVET BREZ VOJN: MORALNI PROSTORI IN ETIKA TRANSNACIONALNEGA KOMUNICIRANJA

MAJID TEHRANIAN

POVZETEK

Dvajseto stoletje je bilo najkrutejše stoletje v človeški zgodovini. Če naj bi bilo 21. stoletje mirnejše, mora človeštvo kreniti po drugih poteh. Tehnologije za množično ubijanje se razvijajo hitreje kot tehnologije miru. Globalno komuniciranje pomeni enega od možnih virov upanja, toda hkrati ko z njim slabijo stare meje, nasprotja in moralne geografije, se ustvarjajo nove. Z globalnimi mrežami strojne in programske opreme velikih in majhnih medijev, ki prodirajo skozi porozne meje, je postalo komuniciranje transnacionalno. Razvilo se je globalno zavedanje, hkrati pa se je prebudila tudi lokalistična zavest marginaliziranih in deprivilegiranih ljudstev in skupin. Dvojni vpliv globalnega komuniciranja tako zastavlja temeljna etična in politična vprašanja glede na tradicionalne, državno določene meje suverenosti, nacionalnosti in državljanskih pravic. Tragične posledice v številnih nacionalnih, verskih in etničnih konfliktih opozarjajo, da so vsiljene državne meje same predmet utemeljenih političnih in moralnih kontroverz. Do vojn je v dvajsetem stoletju prihajalo zaradi spopadov "moralnih prostorov" globalizma, nacionalizma, tribalizma in verskega revanšizma. Od predmodernega prek modernega do postmodernega obdobja so se spremenile tudi identitete in kartografije nasilja v svetu. Kolizija moralnih prostorov v večini sodobnih vojn od Koreje in Vietnama do Perzijskega zaliva, Somalije ter Bosne in Hercegovine pušča malo prostora za moralno samozadovoljstvo. Potrebna je nova etika transnacionalnega komuniciranja, ki bi presegla sisteme držav in bi bila utemeljena na globalnih, nacionalnih in lokalnih interesih in državljanstvih kot legitimnih zahtevah za moralno geografijo. Nova etika bi imela pomembne posledice za prakso mednarodnega komuniciranja in mirovnih pobud. Hkrati pa nova etika zahteva vzpostavitev področij miru pod nadnacionalnim nadzorom povsod tam, kjer dolgotrajni konflikti in spopadi moralnih prostorov ogrožajo temeljne človekove pravice.