THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS IN COMMUNICATION ETHICS

CLIFFORD CHRISTIANS

Introduction

The Enlightenment Age has now run in its course. Today’s gratuitous hedonism and narcissism are modernity at its ragged edge. Post-modernists argue the point in apocalyptic terms — the technocratic and individualistic worldview launched in the 18th century has worked itself out as sociologically repressive and intellectually bankrupt. As the curtain comes down on 300 years of Enlightenment history, we recognise this age as a defining moment in world affairs and communication scholarship.

The foundations on which universal norms are built have eroded. The very concept of norms has been destroyed; we have lost our feeling for them. A secure Newtonian cosmology designed for absolutes and settled meanings has collapsed under assault from Freud, Darwin, Einstein, and Heisenberg. We have allowed cultural diversity to slide into simplistic forms of philosophical relativity until today the idea of a moral order is largely alien to the Western world.

Our predicament is typically understood in terms of language theory and global communications.

In Wittgenstein’s linguistic naturalism, for example, the search for abstract essences entangles us in a maze of propositions that lead finally to the point where the essentialist turn was taken in the first place. Instead of essentialism, we can only claim in mathematical proofs, “this is what we do. This is use and custom among us, a product of our natural history” (Wittgenstein 1956, sect. 61; see Wittgenstein 1953, 116-123). Objects and events situated in time-space contain all the facts there are. In Moritz Schlick’s semantics, “The meaning of a word is solely determined by the roles which hold for its use. Whatever derives from these rules, follows from the mere meaning of the word and is therefore purely analytic, tautological, formal” (Schlick 1949, 277).

The contemporary age, supercharged with information, has become fragmented by linguistic games. In deconstructionist terms, modern discourse is an arbitrary system of differences, oppositions, and conventions, of sliding signs and signifiers...
(Derrida 1984). Forms of representation flash through our experience like a remote control grazing cable television.

In the technical artifice, we are uprooted from history and social memory. Proliferating information technologies have created a hyper-reality of simulated images more definitive for contemporary civilisation than are political institutions, economics, the family, or the church. In what Jean Baudrillard calls “the precession of the simulacra” we create cybernetic models to organise reality, but a reversal occurs and reality arises from them stead. “The real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and command modules,” and humans float anchorless in a sea of electronic images (Baudrillard 1983, 3, 16).\(^1\)

There are major paradoxes in these analyses that centre on language and foundations. But underneath the often shrill rhetoric and overwrought claims, they speak in concert against the totalizing conditions of knowledge that the 18th century fostered — against metaphysics, universal reason, ethical systems, correspondence views of truth, and essentialist theories of human nature. Determined to remove all external authority except human reason, the Enlightenment celebrated advances in science and in politics founded on rational consent.

Ethical rationalism served as the prevailing paradigm in moral philosophy. Rationality marked all legitimate claims about moral obligations. The truth of prescriptions could be settled by formal examination of their logical structure. In this paradigm, theoretical foundations are built by autonomous moral agents who apply rules consistently, formally, and self-consciously. Making cognitive processes explicit combined with the ancient Western emphasis on the universality of reason to create basic rules of morality that everyone was obliged to follow and against which all counterclaims about moral obligation could be measured.

But the modernist project to establish reason and truth as everywhere and always the same has failed. We face now a crisis of validation. What counts anymore as legitimate knowledge? There are no widely accepted rational means for people committed to different beliefs to debate them constructively. For the postmodernist J. F. Lyotard (1988) the possibility of master norms has died. Moral descriptions are considered to have no objective application independently of the conventions and structures of the societies within which they are constituted.

At this critical juncture of history our task is nearly impossible. We need to examine once again whether a universal moral order is conceivable and intellectually defensible. In fact, we need to recover the very idea of moral universals itself. And we must do so without presuming first foundations, without the luxury of an objective metaphysical reality from which to begin. Our only legitimate option is a comparative, cross-cultural ethics that recognises parity and is culturally inclusive rather than biased toward Western hegemony. The future of communication ethics, in Seyla Benhabib’s terms, depends on whether “a post Enlightenment defense of universalism, without metaphysical and historical props, is still viable” (Benhabib 1992, 3). Obviously, as we leave one period of history behind and enter another, the need is not an ethics of any sort under any conditions. A minimalist, limpid, quandary ethics has no contribution to make; parochialism has no credibility whatsoever as the global information society takes shape.
Rather than move uncritically from objectivity to subjectivity, or from correspondence to coherence views of truth, or from relativism to nihilism, I believe resolution emerges from philosophical anthropology. The modernist period co-opted moral issues into epistemology, and when its cognitive system went bankrupt, moral imperatives were destroyed also. But if normativity is adequately understood in terms of our human wholeness, an ontological ground for ethics is once again viable in the contemporary context. Therefore, the question for metaethics: Are there global principles or a moral order or master norms that belong to our humanness as human beings? The philosophy of communication itself offers the possibility of discovering something ontologically — not merely epistemologically — universal. For communication to occur beyond mere transmission, the human being

... must be able to recognize in the “otherness” of its representations that which is intelligible to itself, that is, what is universal in them ... A communicative subject must actually know universals, not in the sense of ... abstractive generalizations, but with the capacity to grasp precisely the universality imminent in the particular ... . The communicative mind must be able to assimilate that universality of something “other,” without thereby losing self-identity, that is to say, without itself becoming something universal ... . The communicative mind comprises both the power of reflection and the potential universality of human consciousness (Henrici 1983, 3).

**Purposive Nature**

The German philosopher, Hans Jonas, illustrates one strategy for establishing the idea of universal norms free of a static, Newtonian cosmology. He turns to nature rather than to modernist foundationalism for grounding a responsibility that is universal in scope and self-evident regardless of our ideologies. Nature has a moral claim on us for its own sake and in its own right. The philosophical rationale for human action is reverence for life on earth, for the organic whole, for the natural, for the physical realm in which human civilisation is situated.

Although the Enlightenment worldview assumed that humans alone are conscious and purposeful, and that nature is spiritless, Jonas contradicts this dichotomy. In his perspective, purpose is embedded in the animate world, and its purposiveness is “evident in bringing forth life. Nature carries on at least one determinate goal — life itself” (Jonas 1984, 71). Thus Jonas concludes chapter three: “Showing the immanence of purpose in nature, ... with the gaining of this premise, the decisive battle for ethical theory has already been won” (Jonas 1984, 78). The alleged chasm between “is” and “ought” has been bridged, at least in principle.

Our duty to preserve nature is to be understood as similar in kind to parents’ responsibility for their children. It is obligation “independent of prior assent or choice; irrevocable, and not given to alteration of its terms by the participants” (Jonas 1984, 95). When new life appears, the forbears do not debate their relationship to it as though the offspring is neutral protoplasm and their responsibility a matter of calculating the options. Parental duty to children is an archetype of the natural accountability Jonas thus establishes — an *apriori* ought, grounded outside subjectivity, an obligation that is timeless and non-negotiable.
Human responsibility regarding natural existence contributes the possibility of intrinsic imperatives to moral philosophy. It demonstrates the legitimacy of concluding that collective duty can be cosmic, primordial, and irrespective of our roles or contracts. Through the preservation of life as the ground for human responsibility, Jonas has established normative discourse to help contradict the post-modern assumption that metaphysical truths do not exist and that no “ought” can be derived from “being.”

Jonas gives responsibility for life a taken-for-granted character. Our human identity is rooted in the nonrelativistic principle that “human beings have certain inescapable claims on one another which we cannot renounce except at the cost of our humanity” (Peukert 1981, 11). As Peukert states it, given the oneness of the human species, our minimum goal must be

...a world in which human beings can find ways of living together which enable every individual to work out a lifestyle based on recognition and respect of others, and to do so ultimately in a universal perspective not confined to small groups or nations ... .Universal solidarity is thus the basic principle of ethics and the normative core of all human communication (Peukert 1981, 10).

The universal sacredness of life itself entails a strong versus weak definition of human dignity. Rather than a minimal condemnation of indignities or merely wishful declarations that we act better,

...human dignity is the respect-worthiness imputed to humankind by reason of its privileged ontological status as creator, maintainer, and destroyer of worlds. Each self shares in this essential dignity (that is, recognized as a moral entity) insofar as it partakes (whether by conscious intention or not) in world building or world destroying actions. Thus human dignity does not rest on intention, moral merit, or subjective definitions of self-interest. It rests on the fact that we are, in this fundamental way that is beyond our intention, human. We are moral agents ... .To assert dignity is to both acknowledge the factuality of human creative agency and to accept responsibility for its use (Stanley 1978, 69-70).

Thus the ongoing vitality of the 1948 Human Rights declaration by UNESCO — every child, woman, and man is worthy of dignity and sacred status. This is our universal commitment with no exceptions for class, gender, or ethnicity. Humans are a unique species. There is no society that has open hunting season on people — In October you can bag three as long as you have a license. This common sacredness of all human beings regardless of merit or achievement is the shared commitment out of which we begin to generate notions of a just society.

Rather than an abstract conception of the good, Emmanuel Levinas argues that the flesh-and-blood Other promotes moral anchorage (Levinas 1979; 1981). Levinas, along with Buber and Marcel, insist that our experience of the Other discloses a sphere of responsibility which is the ground of both propositional language and moral action ... .For Levinas, the face of the Other commands me: Thou shalt not kill .... The face is the epiphany of the nakedness of the Other, a visitation, a coming, a saying which comes in the passivity of the face, not threatening, but obligating. My world is
ruptured, my contentment interrupted. I am already obligated. Here is an appeal from which there is no escape, a responsibility, a state of being hostage. It is looking into the face of the Other that reveals the call to a responsibility that is before any beginning, decision or initiative on my part (Olthuis n.d., 7-9).

In other words, there is a kind of generality which precedes its reification into ethical principles. There is a primordial generality more fundamental than the logos of systematic thought.

Martin Buber makes the dialogic primal in his famous lines, "In the beginning is the relation" and "the relation is the cradle of life" (Buber 1958, 69, 60). He intends that ontologically, as a category of being. Relationships, not individuals per se, have primacy. "The one primary word is the combination I-Thou" (Buber 1958, 3). This irreducible anthropological phenomenon cannot be decomposed into simpler elements without destroying it. There are not three components, sender-message-receiver, to be dismembered for scientific analysis, no even separated and then reconnected dialectically. Through the reciprocal bond human beings are situated in an organic whole without which human existence is impossible.

Buber categorically rejects the Enlightenment’s atomistic individualism, its dualisms between self and language, its dichotomy between subjective and objective. Paulo Freire’s approach to personhood entails the same integrated unity: “I cannot exist without a not-I; in turn the not-I depends on that existence.” “There is no longer ‘I think’ but ‘we think,’” he writes. It is the “we think” which establishes the “I think” and not the contrary. “This co-participation of Subjects in the act of thinking is communication . . . Communication implies a reciprocity which cannot be broken” (Freire 1980, 137-139) — giving and receiving, comprehending and creating, teaching and learning. Communication is a process with a double function — I/Thou or I/it — but never one element in isolation. Communication is not the transference of knowledge, but a dialogic encounter of subjects creating it together.

Freire presumes an explicit anthropology of radical humanness. Humans are not only situated in the natural world but live alongside it, through symbols separating from it in their consciousness. Humans range from a nearly spontaneous response to reality, on the one hand, to a critical process of intervention, on the other. We can even objectify ourselves within out existential experience. As with the dialogic tradition generally, Freire sweeps epistemology into his anthropology. We understand reality when we get inside the self bonded-in-relation and embedded in purposive nature.

This is a philosophy of communication not limited to hermeneutics and semantics, but one that is decidedly “anthropological or more exactly anthro-ontological:”

For one thing, language presupposes corporeality for vocal utterances to be articulated and pronounced. For another, language necessarily refers to a world perceptible to the senses and common to the speaker; it implies their common being-in-the-world (Henrici 1983, 2).

Mediated systems, from this perspective, are inescapably human creations as well. In a literary work or film, the indispensable features of its inner dialectics — the point of departure, plot, setting, overall tone, and resolution of conflicts — all are value driven and either engage a culture’s value system or they cannot be understood.
Dialogic communication — local I-Thouness and universal solidarity — has its rationale in our organic wholeness. Contrary to Cartesian dualism — humans as body and mind — the dialogic worldview is trinitarian: body/mind/spirit; rational/biological-symbolic; thinking/acting/conscience; cognition/skills/interpretation. One humanly integrated whole of three distinct dimensions is harmonised into a unique species without exception.

This third dimension — the interpretive domain — the classical Greeks recognised as the primordial home of language. From the mythological Hermes, inventor of language, Greek litterateurs coined the term hermeneia (hermeneutics, interpretation). Aristotle’s genius brought hermeneutic consciousness into focus as a constituent feature of the human species. He found hermeneia worthy of a major treatise by that title, *On Interpretation*, and he outlined a formal theory in his *Rhetoric*.

But in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle gives the interpretive art its richest meaning. Hermeneia is not theoretical knowledge (episteme), nor is it practical skill (techne), since it concerns more than habit and utility. Making a moral decision, Aristotle argues, entails doing the appropriate action, in the right amount, and with proper timing. Hermeneia discerns, which cannot be confused with logic. This is Aristotelian language confirming that we are moral beings with an orienting system beyond the senses, yet differing from intellection.

Moral insight (phronesis) in Aristotle’s ethical theory has a rational, cognitive element. And techne involves the capacity to explicitly grasp the universal (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 149, 157). Moral insight arises from “the ability to deliberate and consequently to believe through deliberation that something is or is not to be done” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 152). We are unitary beings with our various human capacities feeding into one another. Phronesis is not merely a static grasp of “true universal propositions,” but is necessarily practical “in the sense of actually leading to action” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 168-9). It presumes desire and will, also: “Reasoned argument is not sufficient” to make us act nobly; it only makes us see in particular situations what acts “we already want to do” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 135). Rather than automatically applying a universal good lodged in the intellects, through moral insight humans discover “what should be done in situations in which this is not yet clear” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 238). The point of ethical theory is “action as opposed to mere knowledge” and therefore phronesis presupposes a “desiderative state; it is necessarily motivational” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, 238-9).

Language has the same human home as morality in the centre of our being. Neither can be isolated in the cogito. Discourse is born of conscience. In dialogic theory, the relation, the reciprocal bond centres in the interpretive domain, in hermeneia. Communication rests not in episteme or the monads, but in the interpretive capacity, the spirit. The psuchee concerns a universal modality, East and West. A fulsome anthropology of organic wholeness moves language from its Enlightenment home in cognition to an interpretive axis in values and worldviews — to the human spirit, or, as the centre of our being is sometimes called — to the heart.

If the interpretive domain is lingual, and if language is the matrix of community, then human bonds are not through reason or action but hermeneia. The commonplace, “we’re with you in spirit,” reflects a powerful truth — that our species oneness is born
along the stream of consciousness. We resonate through our spirit cross-culturally to the moral imagination of others everywhere.

The sinews which hold the world together are moral — we are connected as the human whole, spirit-to-spirit. Contrary to what functionalism contends, our international web is not primarily political power or economic interdependence or information technology, but a commitment of conscience which these external apparatuses assume.

Thus Helmut Peukert is justified in making universal human solidarity the normative base of communication ethics. Our mutual humanity is energised by moral obligations which activate our conscience toward the bondedness we share inescapably with others.

Such universal norms as human dignity can only be recovered locally. Language situates them in history. Master norms are of a universal order conceptually speaking, yet human beings enter them through the immediate reality of geography, ideology, and ethnicity. We distinguish between the universal and particular as with a windowpane, knowing there is a decisive break, yet both realms are transparent to each other as well.

_The mind itself, for all its reflexivity, does not penetrate into its own ontological ground. It never encounters anything but representations, and consequently it is the identity or similarity of those representations which must make understanding possible_ (Henrici 1983, 3).

In Levinasian terms, when I turn to the face of the other, I see not only flesh and blood, but the whole of humanity — dialogic communication understood as intersubjective universalism. Defining humans as communication-beings applies "both to the ontogenesis of the individual human being ... and to the hominization of the human species" (Henrici 1983, 2). While proto-norms are experienced locally and inscribed culturally, they simultaneously reflect our common condition as a species.

_Communication can only be conceived as possible if we think of human beings concretely: as an energized unity of corporability, sense perception, mind and spiritual being, and always in an existing community of life, corporeal and mental experience with other human beings. Any philosophy ... sooner or later breaks down over the impossibility of explaining communication ... . Community of life is not only a prerequisite for communication, but equally its result, indeed its purpose_ (Henrici 1983, 4).

A philosophy of communication situated in creatureliness entails a thicker view of moral judgements. Rather than privileging an individualistic, transcendental rationalism, moral commitments are inscribed in our worldviews through which we share a view of reality and establish human community. This model is actually closer to the way the moral imagination operates in everyday life, and refuses to separate moral agents from all that makes them unique. Instead of constructing a purely rational foundation for morality, our mutual human existence across cultural, racial, and historical boundaries is the touchstone of ethics. Ethics is situated fundamentally in the creaturely and corporeal rather than the conceptual. "In this view, ethics ... is as old as creation. Being ethical is a primordial movement in the beckoning force of life itself" (Olthuis n.d., 9).
Conclusion

"Without first principles that require no justification, Aristotle tells us, moral reasoning falls into infinite regression which ends in nothing and makes all ethical discourse meaningless" (Johnstone 1993, 4). For theorists, if moral claims are "unstable and in determinate," the "possibility of doing ethics of all" is jeopardised (Johnstone 1993, 4, 5, 1). "If ethical theory is properly concerned not only with defining key concepts but also with determining the authentic grounds of moral standards, what can be done" if no such grounds exist? Therefore, rather than develop a system of ethical principles in this paper and leave their anchorage unattended, I have focused here on the issue of normativity itself.

Without primal norms, how can we argue that bombing a federal building in Oklahoma City is wrong, that the wanton slaughter of 2,000 Hutus in a refugee camp in Rwanda is morally outrageous, that killing journalists in El Salvador is despicable, that ransacking the earth’s ecosystem is evil? How can we despise Hitler or praise the benefactors of Anne Frank? Without a commitment beyond our own self-interest, our moral claims are only emotional preference.

In normative universals, one finds an alternative to radical approaches which are deconstructive without being clearly transformative. Critical theorists, for example, call for oppositional readings of the dominant ideology, for emancipation from the webs of power that define concrete historical practice. Granted one should advocate a struggle for social justice. But without a philosophically rigorous normative centre, there is no rationale for it other than the arbitrary choice of self-appointed elites. Without norms that are more-than-contingent, emancipatory intentions are threatened fundamentally. Revolutions born of revenge are self-destructive. Successful revolts are normed by conciliation and peace; machine-gunning a tyrant destroys the revenger’s legitimacy. Without proto-norms, history is but a contest of arbitrary power. That is why the French Revolution proved to be a new birth not of freedom but of tyranny.

Over the last decade, the social ethics of Agnes Heller, Charles Taylor and Edith Wyschogrod, and the feminist ethics of Nel Noddings and Seyla Benhabib have made a major impact on ethical theory. Their achievements are of crucial importance for defining the issues in communication ethics as well. Social and feminist ethics make a radical break with the mainstream morality of individual rights. Their communitarian commitment fits hand-in-glove with an interactive philosophy of communication, whereas atomistic ethics is at odds with it. Truth is understood as authenticity in a social context and validity is freed from the correspondence tradition. Confidentiality and promise-keeping are no longer encumbered with Enlightenment privatism. Noddings’ Caring makes the I-Thou encounter normative. Wyschogrod’s Saints and Postmodernism serves as a counterpoint to benign politics, working as she does on human struggles under conditions of oppression.

However, for all their apparent achievements in the particular, on what grounds do we endorse them except as they presuppose and apply dialogic universalism? Without their contributions to universal human dignity, why should we not insist on maintaining the rationalist canon instead? And why should they be considered intellectual advances, rather than endorsing a cynical will of the stronger or a nihilism in which no right or wrong is conceivable?
In asking whether universal truths are possible, I have centred on the irrevocable status of universal human dignity. If one understands the nature of history, language, and our dialogical personhood as cultural beings, human sacredness is inescapable. As we come to live inside universal human solidarity, we recognise there are additional proto-norms entailed by it — justice, truth-telling, nonmaleficence, for example.

To postmodernists and other detractors, universalist positions have discredited themselves, because over history they have seemed to breed totalitarianism.

*Once any group or individual lays claim to knowledge of universal, transcendental truth, then dissenters must be either converted or controlled. This is the genesis of the Inquisition, of the Gulag, and of any ideological oppression* (Johnstone 1993, 6).

Universalism is said to threaten diversity, while relativism liberates in its rejecting the validity of all claims to truth.

In light of this objection, it must be reiterated that the proto-norm of human sacredness is not a foundational claim. This universal, in fact, belongs to a different category, philosophically speaking, than that of objectivist absolutes. Adherence to presuppositions is

*a matter of commitment, not epistemic certainty. We initiate any inquiry or action with ... presuppositions because we must do so, not because they have been demonstrated. One’s commitments are always open to question, and thus are liable to be modified or replaced. But one cannot proceed in any enterprise without taking something as given* (Johnstone 1993, 7).

Cartesian rationalism and Kant’s formalism presumed a Newtonian cosmology. Universal human solidarity does not. It is not Platonism, that is, the finite participating in the infinite and receiving its essence from it. Without a proto-norm of universal scope, our theory and politics are trapped in the distributive fallacy — one particular power bloc presuming to speak for the whole.

Rather than justifying the oppression of non-adherents, universal humaneness seeks to liberate on behalf of the Other. Its dialogic, participatory axis is at odds with the deductivist monologues of one-way tyranny. In Paulo Freire’s terms, this proto-norm radically reinvents power — power in principle no longer adversarial, competitive, and interventionist, but a sovereignty of relation and mutuality. Power in this perspective is an empowering reciprocity between subjects, a relationship not of “distance and domination, but rather of intimacy, vulnerability, and exchange” — power akin to Alcoholics Anonymous where surrender to the community enables members to gain control (Freire 1980, 69). Its measure, in Freire’s terms, is solidarity, the reciprocal enhancement of community. It presumes a populist theory of social change.

A commitment to universals does not eliminate all differences in what we think and believe. Normative ethics grounded in human dignity is pluralistic. The question is whether our values affirm the human good or not. As our ideologies, philosophies of life and beliefs are lobbied within the public sphere, we have a responsibility to make public the course we favour and to demonstrate in what manner it advances our common citizenship. The issue is whether our values help to build a civic philosophy and thereby demonstrate a transformative intent. This is worldview pluralism which
allows us to hold our beliefs in good faith and debate them openly rather than be constrained by a superficial consensus. The standard of judgement is not economic or political success, but whether our worldviews and community formations contribute in the long run to human dignity.

"Contrary to the view of some modern thinkers, a universal ethic complements and even guarantees the right to be different" (Apel 1992, 13). Ethical principles grounded in this universal imperative do not obstruct us and inhibit social progress. As a matter of fact, they liberate us for strategic action and provide a direction for social change.

**Notes:**

1. Cf. Jacques Ellul for a similar description of the technical artifice. In fact, Ellul could well be cited here; he integrates media spectacle more satisfactorily into his philosophy of technology as a whole. While Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux (1991) generally provide a constructive treatment of Baudrillard, I agree with their reluctant conclusion following Kellner: "Baudrillard’s society of simulations ... translates less into a provocative analysis of the changing contours and features of the age than it does into a nihilism that undermines its own radical intent."

2. For a review of important literature since Max Scheler’s *Man’s Place in Nature* in 1928, see Schacht (1990). A classic essay is Ricoeur (1960). Michel Foucault (1973) recognises the implications of focusing the issues in human terms by expressing his contradictions in terms of “the end of man.” For Foucault “the idea of ‘man’ as an interpretive conceptual invention” is no longer viable (Schacht 1990, 158).

3. For an answer to post-modern critics who insist on a more radical alternative than Buber’s I-Thouness, see Steven Kepnes (1991). Kepnes argues that Buber’s interactional self stands between modernity’s autonomous self and post-structuralism’scentred self, entrapped by neither and filling up the space left by both. Buber joins the contemporary critique of atomistic selfishness while offering an alternative model.

4. My summary situating Aristotle’s ethics in his anthropology is rudimentary, of course. And D. S. Hutchinson is undoubtedly correct that an adequate study of Aristotle’s moral philosophy must go beyond his *Nichomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics*, and even further than philosophical anthropology, to encompass metaphysics and philosophical psychology as well (Hutchinson 1986).

5. This model benefits from recent philosophical efforts to develop a rationality that is closer to the actual process of making moral decisions, e.g., Polanyi (1966), Toulmin (1972), White (1981), and Putnam (1975).

**References:**


Derrida, Jacques. 1984. *Deconstruction and the Other*. In R. Kearney (ed.), *Dialogues with Contemporary...*


