Abstract

The creation of a global market has not only contributed to the globalisation of Western and, more specifically, American media around the world, but also opened up the media and communication sectors in large and hitherto highly regulated countries such as China and India. The resultant flow of media products from such countries has created more complex global information, infotainment and entertainment spheres. This article examines the increasing importance of China and India in global communication and media discourses and the challenge that the rise of “Chindia” poses for the study of media and communication. It argues that the globalisation of media industries and audiences, combined with the internationalisation of higher education – reflected in the changing profile of both faculty and students – requires a new approach for research and the teaching of media and communication. While global media and their study remain firmly embedded in a Western or, more accurately, American discourse, the new realities of the post-2008 world warrant a re-evaluation of how we define the global. The article concludes by considering what “Chindia” might mean in a de-Americanised media world.

Daya Kishan Thussu is Professor of International Communication and the Co-Director of the India Media Centre at the University of Westminster in London; e-mail: D.K.Thussu@westminster.ac.uk.
Digitisation and deregulation have transformed the global media landscape, enabling a quantum leap in the production, consumption and distribution of media products across the continents. The creation of a global market, an outcome of major institutional and technological changes introduced during the 1990s, has contributed to the globalisation of Western and, more specifically, American programming around the world, but also made it possible for a reverse flow of media content from the global South. The free-market ideology that such globalisation championed has opened up the media and communication sector in large and hitherto highly regulated countries such as China and India. The resultant flow of media products from such countries has created more complex global information, infotainment and entertainment spheres.

In this article I want to explore the increasing importance of China and India in global communication and media discourses and the challenge that the rise of “Chindia” poses for the study of media and communication. I argue that the globalisation of media industries and audiences, combined with the internationalisation of higher education – reflected in the changing profile of both faculty and students – requires a new approach for research and the teaching of media and communication. I use the motif of de-Americanisation to suggest the ways in which this discourse can be advanced. The article ends with a few reflections on what Chindia would mean in a de-Americanised media world.

A Media Pax Americana?

Despite the unprecedented growth of media and communication industries in the global South, particularly in such countries as China, India and Brazil, the global media continue to be dominated by Hollywood or Hollywoodised content. As during most of the twentieth century, the US remains today the largest exporter both of the world’s entertainment and infotainment programmes and of the computer programming through which these are distributed across the increasingly interconnected and digitised globe. The American media’s imprint on the global communication space, by virtue of the ownership of multiple networks and production facilities, is well documented. As Table 1 shows, in 2011 four out of the five top entertainment corporations in the world were US-based, evidence of the existence of a Pax Americana, a trend which has become pronounced in the era of digital and networked entertainment. These corporations have benefited from the growth of markets in large Southern countries such as China and India.

Table 1: The Top Five Media and Entertainment Corporations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Where based</th>
<th>Fortune 500 Rank</th>
<th>Revenue $ million</th>
<th>Profits $ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vivendi</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>38,248</td>
<td>2,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Disney</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>38,063</td>
<td>3,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comcast</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>37,937</td>
<td>3,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Corp.</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>32,778</td>
<td>2,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Warner</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>26,888</td>
<td>2,578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fortune, July 2011.
Thanks to America’s formidable political, economic, technological and military power, American or Americanised media are available across the globe, in English or in dubbed or indigenised versions. In almost all media spheres the US media giants dwarf their global competitors: from entertainment and sport (Hollywood, MTV, Disney, ESPN) to news and current affairs (CNN, Discovery, Time) and to much-vaunted social media (Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) (UNESCO 2005; Thussu 2006; UNESCO 2009).

These US entertainment and information networks are the movers and shakers of the $1.3 trillion global media and cultural industry, one of the fastest growing in the world, accounting for more than 7 percent of global GDP (UNCTAD 2008). This supremacy is also reflected in the study of media, largely because of the dominance of English as the language of global communication, combined with the fact that the field of communication and media studies emerged in the United States. American communication and media schools have produced the majority of textbooks and journals published in the area, closely followed by Britain.

One result of such a history was that US approaches were adopted in media and communication courses around the world, particularly in the global South, where the “modernisation paradigm” influenced university courses, teaching and research. This liberal tradition of research privileged quantitative work, which was valuable in terms of providing useful data, but less so in analysing the complex political and socio-cultural dimensions of communication in developing countries (Sparks 2007).

As an antidote to such “administrative” research, the Marxism-influenced critical tradition focused on patterns of ownership and production in the media and communication industries, locating these within transnational power structures. However, many critical scholars were constrained by the Cold War ideology, which divided the world into two camps: a capitalist West, led by the United States, and a communist bloc with its centre in Moscow. In such a stark formulation, the authoritarian vs. the liberal media theory shaped the academic discourse. What it failed to take into account was the fact that large, complex countries such as China (the Sino-Soviet rift had taken place in the 1950s) and India (the founding father of the Non-aligned movement) did not fit into this polarised picture of the world.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the demise of such disciplines as “Sovietology” have softened the political edges of critical research, as post-modern, identity-driven media and communication discourses became popular and globalised quickly, entering into hitherto uncharted territories such as China. As capitalism triumphed, the transitional state of the media in the former communist countries of the Eastern bloc alerted scholars such as Downing to re-evaluate Western media theory in view of the political and cultural changes in the European landscape. Downing argued that “to extrapolate theoretically from such relatively unrepresentative nations as Britain and the United States is both conceptually impoverishing and a peculiarly restricted version of even Eurocentricism” (Downing 1996, xi).

With the globalisation of media, scholars began to speak of “de-Westernising” media studies, part of “a growing reaction against the self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory” (Curran and Park 2000, 3). Since then, many other scholars have argued for expanding and internationalising media studies, necessitated by the transformation of media and communication in Asia,
the world’s most populous region, with some of its fastest growing economies, raising questions about what constitutes the “global” in media and its study (Thussu 2009; Wang 2011).

The Rise of China: Rhetoric and Reality

The peaceful “rise” of China as the world’s fastest growing economy has profound implications for the study of global media and communication, taking place in parallel with the transformation of international communication in all its variants – political, intercultural, organisational, developmental and corporate. Since 2006, China has been the largest holder of foreign-currency reserves, estimated in 2012 to be $3.3 trillion. On the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will surpass the United States by 2016, making it the world’s largest economy, according to the International Monetary Fund (see Table 2).

Table 2: The World’s Number 1: China vs. the US (Valuation of GDP based on PPP, in $trillions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>13.74</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>18.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>14.52</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>15.49</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>16.62</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>18.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF.

China has demonstrated extraordinary and unprecedented economic growth in the past quarter of a century. When the country opened up to global businesses in the 1980s, its presence in the international corporate world was negligible. By 2011, China had 61 companies in the Fortune Global 500, just behind Japan (68) and the US (133). Moreover, in 2011, three of the top ten global corporations were Chinese: Sinopec (also known as China Petroleum and Chemical Corp), China National Petroleum (founded only in 2002) and State Grid. For long a preserve of Western companies, Chinese corporations now have a regular presence among the Fortune 500 top ten – a trend in evidence since 2008, the year that cracks in the US-supported neo-liberal global financial infrastructure began to appear. Significantly, these companies are in strategic areas – energy, banking and telecommunications – prompting some economists, such as Subramanian, to argue that China has already become the most economically dominant nation and its currency will before long replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency (Subramanian 2011). A 2012 multinational survey conducted by the Pew Center endorsed this position, saying: “In 2008, before the onset of the global financial crisis, a median of 45 percent named the US as the world’s leading economic power, while just 22 percent said China. Today, only 36 percent say the US, while 42 percent believe China is in the top position” (Pew Center 2012, 24).

China’s success story has many admirers, especially in the developing world, where the Chinese model of a mixture of authoritarian governance and fiscal discipline may be more acceptable (Chan, Lee and Chan 2011). Already there is talk of replacing the “Washington consensus” with what has been termed the “Beijing consensus” (Halper 2010) and this raises questions about global governance under
such a dispensation (Chan, Lee and Chan 2011). As a recent themed issue of the journal China Quarterly on China in Latin America argued:

*China’s officially articulated understanding of its actions in the developing world is a uniform one: ‘going out’ (zou chuqu), ‘mutual benefit,’ and ‘giving and getting,’ all of which is predicated on the principles of mutual respect, absolute state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Each one of these principles can be empirically questioned, but the broad brush strokes of China’s overall understanding of its globalization in the developing world is a relatively coherent one that is then applied to quite different world areas* (Armony and Strauss 2012, 5).

In the creative and cultural industries, too, China has demonstrated very impressive growth, exporting both hard and software for the media and communication industries. China is the world’s biggest mobile telephone market, having the highest blogger population, as well as being the largest exporter of IT products (Montgomery 2010). Media and communication equipment exported from China, including mobile telephones, TV sets, computers, game consoles, video equipment, CD and DVD readers and recorders, are available in markets around the globe (UNESCO 2009).

China is investing heavily in its external communication, including broadcasting and on-line presence, as well as in the proliferation of Confucius Institutes across the globe, part of Chinese public diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007; Wang 2008; Lai and Lu 2012). Chinese President Hu Jintao has stressed the importance of culture: “Culture has become a more and more important source of inspiration for national cohesion and creativity and a more and more significant factor in the competition of national comprehensive power (zonghe guoli) and the Chinese people have an increasingly ardent desire for a richer cultural life” (cited in Zhang 2010, 383).

The Chinese film and television industry has had a global dimension with its audiences in the Sino-sphere, with notable centres like Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore (Curtin 2007). Such international hits as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), Hero (2002), and House of Flying Daggers (2004) have created a Chinese presence in the global entertainment arena. These products also demonstrate a collaboration with Hollywood marketing and distribution networks, a trend which has been considerably strengthened since then as China has become a lucrative market for Hollywood companies (in 2011, overall Chinese box-office takings crossed the two billion dollar mark). It is thus not surprising that major Hollywood companies including DreamWorks and Fox have been involved in co-production projects.

**Global Bollywood and Beyond**

Though not growing at the same pace and scale as China, India, the other Asian giant, has also demonstrated a robust annual economic performance in the past decade and is increasingly viewed internationally as an emerging economic and political power (Kumar and Puranam 2011; Nayyar 2012). On the basis of purchasing-power parity, India was the fourth largest economy in 2010, behind Japan, China and the US. However, compared with China’s 61, India had only eight corporations in the Fortune 500 list in 2011. The rapid liberalisation, dere-
gulation and privatisation of media and cultural industries in the world’s largest democracy, coupled with the increasing availability of digital delivery and distribution technologies, have ensured that Indian content is increasingly visible in the global media sphere (Athique 2012). The most prominent manifestation of Indian content in global media is India’s $3.5 billion film industry, which has helped to make the country an attractive tourism and investment destination. “Bollywood” is the world’s largest film factory in terms of production and viewship: every year a billion more people buy tickets for Indian movies than for Hollywood films. Indian films are increasingly being watched by international audiences in more than 70 countries (Kaur and Sinha 2005; Thussu 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008; Rai 2009; Dudrah 2012).

Though India has been exporting films to countries around the world since the 1930s, it was only during the 1990s that Bollywood became part of the “global popular” (Thussu 2008; Rai 2009; Dudrah 2012). The unprecedented expansion of television in the past two decades – from a state monopoly until 1991 to 500 plus channels in 2012 – was a boost for the movie industry, as many dedicated film-based pay channels emerged.

Digitisation and the growing availability of satellite and cable television have ensured that Indian films are regularly shown outside India and with the new digital delivery mechanism, distributed via many different modes, defining popular culture among the 35-million strong South Asian diaspora, scattered in all continents (Athique 2012). One result of such interest was that diasporic film makers such as US-based Mira Nair (director of the 2001 Bollywood-inspired comedy Monsoon Wedding) and the British-based Gurvinder Chaddha (director of the 2002 comedy Bend It Like Beckham and the 2003 film Bride and Prejudice) have set out to make films that bridge Western and Indian popular cinema (Matusitz and Payano 2011; Dudrah 2012).

Another factor which has contributed to the popularisation of Bollywood is the growing presence of Western actors appearing in Indian films. Examples include the British actor Rachel Shelly, who was part of the love triangle in the 2001 commercially and critically acclaimed Lagaan (Land Tax), while British actress Alice Patten was the leading lady in the 2006 hit Rang De Basanti (Colour it Saffron). Indian films were also popular in the Soviet Union and continue to be viewed in Russia (Rajagopalan 2008) and in Japan (Matsuoka 2008). In Germany, mainstream television channels such as RTL regularly screen Bollywood movies dubbed in German. Apart from the diasporic and Western market, Bollywood films have traditionally been popular among other developing countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In Nigeria, musicians of the Ushaq’u Indiya (Society for the Lovers of India) use “vocal harmonies” from Hindi film lyrics and rework them into Hausa versions (Uba Adamu 2010), while in Indonesia, local music has been influenced by Indian musicals (David 2008). Bollywoodised content has even reached Brazil, itself a major producer of popular entertainment. One prominent example is the hugely successful India-themed Brazilian soap opera called “India – A Love Story,” screened in prime-time in 2009 on TV Globo, which won an International Emmy Award for best telenovela.

Television contributes to this globalisation process, selling the glitz and glamour of Bollywood to global audiences. The transmission of the annual International Indian Film Academy (IIFA) awards attracts huge audiences internationally. These

According to industry estimates, the Indian entertainment and media industry is worth $29 billion, while exports from its information technology and IT-enabled services have reached $148 billion (UNCTAD 2008; FICCI/KPMG Report 2011; Amin 2011; Karnik 2012). As the UN’s Creative Economy Report 2010 recorded, India showed the largest growth in exports of creative goods during 2002-2008 (UNCTAD 2010). In addition to indigenous media products, India is increasingly a production base for transnational – largely US-based – media conglomerates, especially in areas such as animation and post-production services for Hollywood and other media industries. These growing cultural links with the US-dominated transnational media conglomerates also facilitate the marketing and distribution of Indian content (Kohli-Khandekar 2010). As international investment increases in the media sector, after cross-media ownership rules are relaxed, new synergies are emerging between Hollywood and Bollywood: Indian media companies too are investing in Hollywood productions (Kohli-Khandekar 2010; Thomas 2010). The changing geo-political equation in Asia, which has led to a closer economic and strategic relationship between Washington and New Delhi, has given a boost to this process.

This is also the case in India’s dynamic news media landscape, with 122 round-the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of English-language journalism. Global news players have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, for example CNN, with CNN-IBN, an English news and current affairs channel, launched in 2005 in association with TV-18 Group, while Times Now, owned by the Times of India Group, ran a joint news operation with Reuters between 2006-2008. Such channels have a global reach and ambition. The richer members of the Indian diaspora – estimated to have a net worth of $300 billion – are tuning in to Indian news channels and on-line news portals to keep abreast of developments (Kapur 2010). There has also been a massive expansion in newspaper circulation: India is the world’s largest newspaper market with 110 million copies sold every day, according to the World Association of Newspapers. Many of these newspapers are in the English language, with journalists who can operate in a global media sphere. Indian-born or Indian-origin journalists are increasingly visible in leading international news outlets in the West.

The Other Globalisation: China+India = Chindia

What is the bilateral relationship between the world’s two ancient civilisations, with the largest populations and fastest growing economies? Jairam Ramesh, political analyst and currently India’s Rural Development Minister, is credited with coining the term “Chindia,” a phenomenon representing what has been termed as the “rise of the rest” in a “post-American world” (Ramesh 2005; Zakaria 2008). The idea of this neologism seems to be catching on; a Google search for the word
“Chindia” shows more than 800,000 hits. Any meaningful discussion of global media research ought to take into account the rapid growth of these two large nations with their potential to influence the emerging global scene (Khanna 2007; Meredith 2007; Smith 2007; Engardio 2007; Sheth 2008; Emmott 2008; Sharma 2009; Bardhan 2010; Kaur and Wahlberg 2012; also see the special themed issue of Global Media and Communication, 2010). As Bardhan has noted: “In 1820 these two countries contributed nearly half of world income; in 1950 their share was less than one tenth; currently it is about one fifth, and the projection is that in 2025 it will be about one third” (Bardhan 2010, 1).

As in many other fields, the “rise” of China and India, coinciding with the crisis in the neo-liberal model of US-led Western capitalism, will challenge traditional thinking and research paradigms for international media and communication as power begins to swing away from the West (Kaur and Wahlberg 2012). As one commentator notes: “A seismic shift in the balance of global economic and political power is currently underway as the rise of China and India has increased not only their regional but also their global influence and leverage” (Sharma 2009, 9). The combined economic and cultural impact of China and India, aided by their extensive global diasporas, may create a different form of globalisation, one with an Asian accent (Sun 2009; Kapur 2010; Amrith 2011).

The millennium-old relationship between the two countries has always had a very strong cultural and communication dimension and Buddhism was at the heart of this interaction. The interest in Buddhist philosophy encouraged Chinese scholars, most notably Huen Tsang, to visit such places as Nalanda (an international Buddhist university based in eastern India between the 5th to 12th centuries) to exchange ideas on law, philosophy and politics. Indian monks also visited China on a regular basis and such cultural interactions led to the translation into Chinese of the Sanskrit text Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Diamond Sutra), the world’s first printed book on paper, published in the ninth century (Sen 2005). These exchanges of ideas and ideologies continued for centuries and even today Buddhism remains a powerful link between the two civilisations.

In modern times, Indian interest in China was most noticeable in such intellectuals as poet-philosopher Rabindranath Tagore (the first non-Westerner to win a Nobel Prize for Literature, in 1913) (see Chung et al 2011). During the Cold War years, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru coined the slogan “Hindi-Chini, bhai bhai” (India and China are brothers). The 1962 border war following the flight of the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama to India put an end to such exhortations of Asian solidarity against the imperialist West (Zhao 2009). The resultant Sino-Indian schism continues to afflict policy-makers and educated public opinion in India, which fears growing Chinese influence in South Asia (Pant 2012). Apart from the contentious border dispute, both countries also vie for resources and the leadership role of the global South (Cheru and Obi 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2011; Pant 2012).

And yet there are growing commercial and cultural links developing between the two countries. Trade between China and India – negligible in 1992 – had grown within a decade to $5 billion, and had reached $75 billion by 2011, making India’s eastern neighbour one of its largest trading partners. According to industry estimates, this is on course to achieve the target of $100 billion by 2015, although the balance of trade – nearly $20 billion – remains firmly in China’s favour. Chinese investment in India – actual and proposed – especially in such sectors as power
and telecommunications, is constantly escalating, estimated to be worth $50 billion. Apart from the business press, these stories of a Chindian globalisation rarely get noticed in the international media and, ironically, not even in the media in China and India.

In popular entertainment, however, Indian content is being noticed in China after a break of many decades. During the Cold War years, Indian films were widely circulated in China, where the escapist musical melodramas were considered by the Communist authorities to be a useful alternative to state propaganda and a cheap substitute for Hollywood. A shortened, digitised and dubbed version of Lagaan was released across 25 theatres in China, the first Indian film to be imported by the China Film Group. The film’s music director, A. R. Rahman, also composed the music for the 2003 Chinese film Tiandi Yingxiong (Warriors of Heaven and Earth), the 2004 Chinese official entry for the Oscars. The 2005 Bollywood-inspired Chinese film Perhaps Love – the first musical in that country since the 1950s – was an interesting example of a Chindian cultural product. That Indian films have an audience in China was shown by the box office success there of the 2009 Indian college comedy Three Idiots.

Chindia and Global Media Research

The academic study of media and communication – relatively new subjects in both China and India – is growing rapidly in both countries. By 2012, more than 800 communication and media programmes were being run at Chinese universities, paralleled by the publication of many Chinese language journals in the field, as well as China-related material in international journals. Prominent in the latter category is the Hong Kong-based Chinese Journal of Communication, operational since 2009. In India, the massive growth of the media sector has forced the academic community and policy establishment to encourage and support research and study in this field. This has contributed to the mushrooming of mostly vocational media research institutes, though some critical work is beginning to emerge. China and India offer potentially lucrative markets for students in media and communication, as both countries are large suppliers of postgraduate and research students to Western universities. Already many Western universities are developing new courses and collaborative projects with institutions of higher education in China and India.

The increasing mobility of students and faculty and the organisation of short courses and exchange programmes have also contributed to this intercultural and international communication. However, more often than not these projects are driven by economic and not intellectual considerations. Intellectual curiosity about Chindia is often confined to specialists, at a time when internationalisation should be an integral part of teaching and research in media and communication, given the global nature of the subject and the globalisation of media and communication industries. Such an altered academic environment demands what Appadurai has called “deparochialization of the research ethic – the idea of research itself” (Appadurai 2001, 15).

Can the growth of media and communication studies in Chindia contribute to broadening research concerns and agendas in this relatively new field? Conforming to the social sciences more generally, research in the media and communication arena too has been traditionally influenced by what Edward Said has shown as a
Eurocentric essentialism of thought, where the “other” was imagined or created as part of an ideological discourse, privileging European imperialist epistemology (Said 1978). Such a pervasive Occidental bias constitutes, in the words of Samir Amin, “one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world” (Amin 1989, vii).

The Chindian communication challenge is difficult to analyse within traditional Western-originated and oriented media theory – whether liberal or critical, though both have useful insights to offer (Curran and Park 2000; Hallin and Mancini 2012). This calls for original and innovative research methods and methodological approaches and theoretical interventions as well as a radical re-evaluation of pedagogic parameters, taking historical, cultural and socio-psychological factors into consideration. One research area where a Chindian contribution will be particularly valuable is development communication. China and India have very impressive records of alleviating extreme poverty in recent decades, as a new report from the United Nations attests. Nearly half of the two billion people who have gained access to drinking water, and four out of 10 who have gained access to improved sanitation since 1990, live in China or India (UNICEF & WHO, 2012). However, it is important to emphasise that despite robust economic growth – almost double-digit for nearly a decade in the case of China – both countries continue to have very large numbers of poor and disadvantaged people (Zhao 2008; Kohli 2012). India was the first country to use television for education through its 1970s SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment) programme. New digital media technologies can be deployed to promote the Gandhian notions of community living and sustainable development. China’s aid for developing countries in Asia and Africa, especially in such areas as telecommunication, may help to promote a Chinese version of development discourse: the China Great Wall Industry Corporation has been offering expertise and funding to develop satellite and other space programmes. Traditionally, the development discourse has been devised and developed in the West, conforming to a Western sensibility of what constitutes development. Would a Chindian development perspective be less affected by the colonial mindset? Already, in many developing countries in Latin America (Armony, Ariel and Strauss 2012) and Africa (Sauvant et al 2010; Cheru and Obi 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2011, also see Chan, Lee and Chan 2011 and Lai and Lu 2012) these debates have occupied policy and media agendas.

De-Americanising Media Studies

As noted earlier, the dominant strands of research in global media and communication have traditionally been conducted within a Western, or more accurately, an American framework. The question arises whether such a framework is adequately equipped – both theoretically and empirically – to comprehend the complexity of the Chindian globalisation which challenges established ways of thinking about international media and communication (Abbas and Erni 2005; Miike 2006; Thussu 2009; Curtin and Shah 2010; Wang 2011). In an increasingly mobile and globally networked and digitised world, media and communication studies have been transformed as South-South and increasingly, South-North cultural flows erode US cultural hegemony. It is interesting to speculate what kind of content will be circulating on the world wide web and in which language when
90 percent of Chinese and equally high percentage of Indians get on-line (in 2011, 40 percent of China’s and only 10 percent of India’s billion plus population were using the Internet) (Internet World Stats 2012). This is particularly striking in the context of India’s “demographic dividend”: more than 70 percent of Indians are below the age of 30 (Nilekani 2009; Bahl 2010). As their prosperity grows, a sizeable segment of young Indians are increasingly going on-line, producing, distributing and consuming digital media, especially using their skills in the English language, the vehicle for global communication and increasingly for global higher education.

Internationalising media studies is a strengthening imperative as universities themselves become globalised. China has significantly increased its university sector, encouraging elite foreign universities to set up campuses in the country. In India too, the government is liberalising the higher education sector, opening it to foreign universities. The government has quadrupled the allocation for higher education from barely 0.37 percent to 1.5 percent of the GNP, supplemented by a massive expansion of private education providers, including some of India’s top corporate houses with such global brands as Reliance and Tata (the latter gave a gift of $50 million to Harvard Business School, the biggest international donation since the school’s founding). A democratic polity has ensured that Indian universities have intellectual autonomy where debate and discussion are the norm, nurturing the “argumentative” Indian (Sen 2005). Unlike other social sciences, media and communication studies were not part of elite university education. As formerly in Britain, university education in India remains an elitist endeavour – media was taught predominantly in a vocational context and since the industry was so small, there were few students and even fewer researchers. However, with the massive growth of media and communication, more and more universities are now taking this field seriously. Indian academia is deeply entrenched in a tradition of argumentation and critical conversation (Sen 2005; Bayly 2011; Kapila 2011; Kumar and Puranam 2011). As Indian media and academia globalise, will this critical mass contribute to critical media studies? Indian scholars and scholars of the Indian diaspora have a good record for pushing the boundaries of research in social sciences, and increasingly in media and communication studies. It may be indicative of such cultural autonomy that despite close economic, political and cultural ties with the US, including widespread use of the English language, most urban Indians do not care for American music, movies and television and only 19 percent like American programming, as against 43 percent of Chinese (Pew Center 2012).

Their interest in China is even more limited and generally negative (Pew Center 2012, 47). In the popular Indian mind, the image of China remains “effectively frozen in time, leaving the dominant public perception of China as it was in the early 1960s – an image of both menace and duplicity” (Uberoi 2011). For the Chinese, India is little more than a curiosity and a noisy and unwieldy neighbour. Restricted people-to-people contact and absence of media coverage in each country of the other (both focused on the West, and on the US in particular) sustains this perception. However, as Isar has suggested, there is increasing demand for “an independent, cross-cultural conversation among the newly affluent and mobile intelligentsias of both countries” (Isar 2010, 281).

The British media sociologist Jeremy Tunstall published a much-cited book in 1977 called The Media Are American. Thirty years later, he came round to the view that such a formulation was not sustainable in a world where America was
one of the many, though still premium, players, appropriately entitling his new book The Media Were American (Tunstall 1977 and 2008). Rohn predicts that if a book on global media is published in 30 years’ time, it is “highly probable that it will not have the word ‘American’ in it at all” (Rohn 2010, 371). This seems unlikely, given the formidable media, information and communication power that the United States wields, especially in the realm of on-line communication – of both apparatus and application.

It is fair therefore to suggest that the Chindia challenge is not going to undermine, at least in the short term, the multi-faceted US domination of the world’s media, through what I have elsewhere described as “glocal Americana” (Thussu 2006) but, as Jack Goody has argued, “the Western domination of the world of knowledge and of world culture persists in some respects but has been significantly loosened. Globalisation is no longer exclusively Westernization” (Goody 2010, 125). This would argue for a serious engagement with the emerging communication cultures of Chindia and a concomitant recalibration of the field of media studies.

References:


