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Javnost - The Public, Vol. 30 - 2023, No. 4

, , pages: 445-471

This study engages in the academic effort of moving beyond the “repression-resistance” lens by shedding light on the civic function of exposure to cross-cutting arguments and their (in-) civility on individual’s expression willingness and discursive quality in China’s cyberspace. While civility and dissonant-viewpoint exposure are viewed as the hallmark of political deliberation and public sphere in most Western societies, whether their potential could be realised in a censored yet increasingly pluralist media space in China remains a question. Through experiment method (N = 1064), participants were exposed to dissonant (civil/uncivil) viewpoints that were selected, manipulated, and presented as original Weibo posts, regarding a controversial marital policy. Our results illustrate that exposure to civil yet reasoned cross-cutting information significantly provokes individuals’ willingness to engage in a manner of reciprocal civility. Implications are discussed for deliberation studies and internet governance.

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, , , , pages: 472-495

Deliberation is classically understood as a communication process where equal participants justify their positions in a respectful, reciprocal, argumentative manner. However, critical scholars have argued for a concept of deliberation that incorporates other forms of communication beyond argumentation, for example, expressions of emotions. While previous research focused on differences between positive and negative emotions, we introduce a distinction between constructive and non-constructive expressions of emotions. Whilst constructive emotions focus on the discussed issue, non-constructive emotions refer to other participants. We draw on a quantitative relational content analysis of user comments written in an online-participation platform. The results show a positive effect of constructive expressions of emotions on the deliberative quality of interactive user comments and a negative effect of non-constructive expressions of emotions. Overall, we conclude that emotions can promote the deliberative quality of interactive user comments if they are not focused on other participants but on the discussed issue.

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, , pages: 496-512

The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the important yet controversial role of scientific expertise in public life. While existing debates focus mostly on necessary changes to (1) how experts are involved in public and political debates or (2) the way science itself is conducted, we conceptualise role of digital technology and the rise of the “new” social media through the theoretical framework provided by Jürgen Habermas. Drawing on Habermas’s recent reflections on the new “structural transformation” of the digital public sphere, we identify two areas where science and its interaction in the public sphere can be improved to address declining trust in scientific expertise: namely, digital design and user education. On the one hand, democracies need to focus on the architecture of the public sphere when trying to re-establish trust in science. On the other hand, individual user education addresses the choices individuals are making regarding which information they use when they engage in public debates.

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, , , , pages: 513-533

Though the term originated in the early twentieth century, it is only recently “wokeness” has become a staple of British media discourse. Typically, the concept features in commentaries and exchanges about institutional power, censorship, minority rights/representation, and structural racism, i.e. “culture wars” discourses. Polling suggests that the public considers wokeness a threat despite lacking clarity or consensus on its specific meaning. This study addresses this ambiguity, combining an analysis of coverage in the UK press with posts on Twitter and a questionnaire, asking UK respondents to define and exemplify wokeness. All samples revealed a multi-faceted concept observed at individual, group, cultural and corporate levels. A range of positive and negative framings were found, e.g. awareness and compassion vs. weakness and puritanism. Broader narratives constructed around wokeness include aspirational traits, moral posturing, a modern secular religion, and an insurgent “woke agenda.” These offer insights into how the concept is characterised and operationalised.

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, , , pages: 534-550

The phrase “fake news” has become a household term in recent years, a feat that can in large part be attributed to its popularity during the Trump presidency. Utilising social media platforms such as Twitter, the former president and his followers used the hashtag #FakeNews to attack politicians, civic leaders, as well as media organisations with the goal of “draining the swamp.” This combination of anti-establishment rhetoric with the status quo embodied by the Office of the President raises questions about whether the rhetoric associated with the hashtag is genuine, citizen-driven critique or is in fact a form of flak, a critique of the news media produced by powerful organisations and governmental entities, as defined by the Propaganda Model (PM). This study offers an empirical analysis through a qualitative examination of social media posts using #FakeNews in conjunction with posts about immigration issues 2016–2020. Findings show that both pro-Trump and anti-Trump Twitter users utilise #FakeNews to attack the other side, obfuscate the issue, or double down on their stance, indicating that flak is systemically generated to distract citizens from effectively challenging the status quo.

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, pages: 551-565

Past research has noted that alternative media often facilitate debate between activists and advocates for political policies. However, such research does not typically address the processes for those debates. In recent years, political influencers have increasingly made debates important content in the alternative media they produce through streaming services. In 2021, I observed a debate between three influencers that took place through YouTube and Twitch. In this research project, I engaged in a qualitative content analysis of key texts, using concepts concerning debate from past political communication research. Specifically, I examined the pre-debate, debate and post-debate stages in order to identify different attacks, acclaims or defences utilised by the influencers. The findings, viewed through the lens of mediated construction of reality described by Couldry and Hepp, demonstrate that those linear stages established in past campaign research do not fully apply to the context of alternative media found on streaming services. Instead, this debate was a nonlinear process in which the “pre-debate” stage was actually the debate.

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, , pages: 566-585

Within what is known as the post-truth era, politicians strategically trade in alternative interpretations of data, make bold populist claims and on occasions be completely dishonest for party political gains. Such practices coincide with ever-declining trust in politicians and the democratic system, a phenomenon common to both Spain and the UK. We enquire whether public mistrust is deserved exploring the extent party leaders employ misinformation as part of their strategic communication. The paper analyses falsehoods made by political leaders as determined by major fact-checking sites EFE Verifica and Newtral in Spain, and the UK’s BBC Reality Check and Full Fact. We categorise falsehoods as misinformation, alternative facts, bullshit or lies. Results show right-wing parties most responsible for all forms of falsehoods, or they are most likely to face analysis from factcheckers. Falsehoods are used by governments defending their policies, but also by oppositions to attack the government; especially alternative facts. The overwhelming majority of policy attacks based on false information are from opposition parties, particularly Spanish parties on the right. The flagrant use of bullshit and lies, while simultaneously calling out their more mainstream opponents for similar practices, poisons the notion of democratic pluralism and makes low public trust seem perfectly justified.

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, pages: 586-602

This article uses qualitative discourse analysis to examine how the (post-)communist past is remembered in right-wing counter-publics. If memory serves the historical legitimation of the political order, its challengers would be expected to use this part of history to prove the legitimacy of an alternative order. The memory discourse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and German unity in the newspaper Junge Freiheit and the magazine Compact serves as a case study. Both publications consider themselves mouthpieces of a far-right readership in Germany and represent positions close to that of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The results show that hegemonic narratives can be found in both publications but that the East and its history are discursively valorised. Against the backdrop of the failure to develop an all-German post-communist memory culture, this article provides clues as to which “historical” arguments fall on fertile ground in right-wing counter-publics and help grow right-wing politics.

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, , pages: 603-621

This paper focuses on the visual representation of “the urban people” by the Spanish left-wing populist party Unidas Podemos (UP) during the campaign for regional elections in Madrid in 2021. The political environment was characterised by increasing polarisation and the hyper-leadership of two candidates, right-wing Isabel Díaz Ayuso and UP’s national leader Pablo Iglesias. In this context, UP employed a diverse range of images and audio-visual material with a specific focus on the urban dimension. This paper explores how the populist logic and societal split—the people vs. the elite—deployed by UP are visually represented and connected with the urban space. Drawing on the central role of images in politics, this paper contributes to the emerging scholarship on the visual and spatial dimensions of populism by (a) exploring the connections between populist imaginary, space, and the visual; (b) advancing an empirical analysis of the image of “the people” in a left-wing political party; and (c) connecting the imaginary of populism to its geo-graphical dimension, stressing both the urban and class divide.

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